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The German Commercial Code (’HGB’) allows banks to build visible reserves for
general banking risks according to section 340g HGB. These ’GBR reserves’ may, in
addition to their risk provisioning function, be used to enhance capital endowment,
for internal ﬁnancing, signaling or earnings management purposes. We analyze ﬁ-
nancial statements of German banks for the period from 1995 through 2007 to reveal
speciﬁc patterns in the use of GBR reserves. Our empirical investigation is based on
a large, unbalanced panel of German banks including 32,023 bank-year observations.
We see an increase in the use of GBR reserves over time. Furthermore, we can say
that GBR reserves are primarily used by large banks, banks with comparatively low
regulatory capital endowment, as well as those with lower risks. Furthermore, GBR
reserves are used by fairly proﬁtable banks, those reporting according to interna-
tional ﬁnancial reporting standards in addition to HGB, and banks which are not
thrifts or cooperative banks. Finally, we ﬁnd that banks which make use of hidden
reserves according to section 340f HGB also tend to hold GBR reserves. We explain
our ﬁndings with regulatory factors and existing information asymmetries as well as
banks’ size and ownership structure.
Key Words: Bank regulation, informational asymmetries, risk provisioning, visible
reserves, hidden reserves.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G21, G32, M41.
AbstractNon- echnical ummary
Section 340g of the German Commercial Code (’HGB’) allows banks to build visi-
ble reserves for general banking risks (henceforth: GBR reserves). Obviously, these
visible reserves are meant to take account of any kind of general risks banks may
be exposed to. They have to be disclosed as a separate item on the liability side
of the balance sheet and their allocation is clearly visible from the proﬁt and loss
account. They are acknowledged as tier 1 capital and the decision to set them aside
is taken by the bank’s management. In addition to their risk provisioning function,
these visible reserves may also be used to enhance capital endowment, for internal
ﬁnancing and for signaling purposes.
We analyze the ﬁnancial statements of German banks for the period from 1995
through 2007 to reveal speciﬁc patterns in the use of GBR reserves. We explain our
ﬁndings with regulatory aspects and existing information asymmetries as well as the
size and the ownership structure of banks. Our results are as follows:
• Larger banks are more likely to use visible GBR reserves, and they also hold
a higher percentage of these reserves relative to their total assets. The same
holds for banks with low regulatory capital endowment and for banks which
are already using hidden reserves according to section 340f HGB.
• Banks subject to public law make use of GBR reserves less often and to a
smaller extent. The same relationship is found for banks with higher risks in
their loan portfolios, i.e. for banks with relatively high non-performing loan
ratios.
• Banks with a higher return on assets and banks under IFRS tend to build GBR
reserves more often and to a greater extent.
• Both the share of banks making use of GBR reserves and the ratio of these
reserves to total assets increase over time. This almost monotonic trend is con-
ﬁrmed even when controlling for all other relevant factors in panel regressions.
tsNichttechnische Zusammenfassung
Das deutsche Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB) erlaubt Kreditinstituten die Bildung eines
Fonds f¨ ur allgemeine Bankrisiken nach § 340g. Sowohl die Bildung als auch die H¨ ohe
dieser Reserven m¨ ussen in der Gewinn- und Verlustrechnung bzw. in der Bilanz eines
Instituts klar ausgewiesen werden. Sie werden als Kernkapital anerkannt und die
Entscheidung ¨ uber ihre Bildung wird vom Bankmanagement getroﬀen. Zus¨ atzlich
zur Risikoabsicherung k¨ onnen diese Reserven auch zur Erh¨ ohung der Kapitalaus-
stattung, zur internen Finanzierung und zu Signalisierungszwecken genutzt werden.
Wir untersuchen Bilanzdaten deutscher Banken im Zeitraum 1995 bis 2007, wobei
wir speziﬁsche Verhaltensmuster in der Nutzung des Fonds f¨ ur allgemeine Bankrisiken
aufzeigen. Wir erkl¨ aren unsere Erkenntnisse mit regulatorischen Gegebenheiten,
existierenden Informationsasymmetrien, sowie durch die Gr¨ oße und die Eigent¨ umer-
struktur von Banken. Unsere Ergebnisse sind wie folgt:
• Gr¨ oßere Banken weisen eine h¨ ohere Wahrscheinlichkeit zur Bildung von 340g-
Reserven und auch einen h¨ oheren Anteil dieser Reserven an der Bilanzsumme
auf. Gleiches gilt f¨ ur Banken mit einer niedrigen regulatorischen Eigenkapital-
ausstattung und Institute, die bereits stille 340f-Reserven nutzen.
• ¨ Oﬀentlich-rechtliche Banken nutzen 340g-Reserven weniger h¨ auﬁg und in gerin-
gerem Maße als andere Institute. Gleiches gilt f¨ ur Banken mit hohen Risiken
im Kreditportfolio, d. h. f¨ ur Banken mit einem relativ hohen Anteil an notlei-
denden Krediten.
• Banken mit einem h¨ oheren ROA (operatives Ergebnis als Anteil an der Bi-
lanzsumme) bilden 340g-Reserven mit einer h¨ oheren Wahrscheinlichkeit und
in einem h¨ oheren Maße. Gleiches gilt f¨ ur Institute, die zus¨ atzlich nach IFRS
bilanzieren.
• Es kann gezeigt werden, dass sowohl die Wahrscheinlichkeit zur Bildung von
340g-Reserven als auch deren Anteil an der Bilanzsumme im Zeitablauf ansteigen.
Diese Aussage gilt auch dann, wenn in Regressionsanalysen f¨ ur s¨ amtliche an-
deren wesentlichen Faktoren kontrolliert wird.Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Related Literature 3
3 Legal Framework 5
4 Theoretical Background 7
4.1 Motives for (Not) Using GBR Reserves ................. 7
4.2 Hypotheses ................................ 1 2
5 Empirical Analysis 15
5 . 1 D a t aa n dV a r i a b l e s............................ 1 5
5 . 2 R e s u l t s................................... 1 9
5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics ....................... 1 9
5.2.2 Regression Models ........................ 2 2
6 Conclusion 29List of Tables
1 Evaluation of GBR reserves and the alternatives. ........... 1 2
2 C o v e r a g eb yb a n kg r o u p sf o rs e l e c t e dy e a r s( i n% ) . .......... 1 6
3 Number of observations in the panel by bank categories over time. . . 16
4 Number of banks and mean of observations in the panel by category. 18
5 P a i r w i s ec o r r e l a t i o n s ............................ 1 8
6 Number of activities involving GBR reserves over time. ........ 2 1
7 Results of pooled regression models. ................... 2 4
8 Coeﬃcients of random eﬀects models. .................. 2 7
List of Figures
1 Share of banks using GBR reserves per bank category over time. . . . 20
2 GBRTA b yb a n kc a t e g o r yo v e rt i m e . .................. 2 11 Introduction
Banks are considered to be fairly opaque and intransparent institutions compared
to many other industries.1 Insight into and understanding of the banking business is
not widespread among the public. Existing bank-speciﬁc accounting rules certainly
do much to add to this image. These special norms and the consequent lack of trans-
parency in banks’ ﬁnancial reporting are justiﬁed by the particular kinds and levels
of risk banks are exposed to. Conﬁdence in and the stability of the banking sector
are deemed to be vital for the well-being of the world’s economies. This becomes
even more evident when looking at the turmoil caused by the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
To achieve ﬁnancial stability and to foster conﬁdence, on the one hand, regulatory
bodies impose certain restrictions on the amount of risky assets held by banks in
relation to their capital resources.2 On the other hand, legal bodies generally allow
the building of reserves and loss provisions within banks’ ﬁnancial statements.
The German Commercial Code (’HGB’) in particular contains two unique but very
diﬀerent instruments permitting banks to build reserves. Firstly, section 340f HGB
allows speciﬁed ﬁnancial assets to be deliberately undervalued within certain lim-
its. This is often referred to as creating hidden reserves (for simplicity called ’340f
reserves’ hereinafter). Secondly, a bank may increase its visible reserves, so called
’Reserves for General Banking Risks’ in accordance with section 340g HGB (for sim-
plicity called ’GBR reserves’ hereinafter). These two types of reserves diﬀer greatly
with respect to their visibility on the balance sheet. Thus, banks may use them
for very diﬀerent reasons. Whereas the creation of hidden reserves has a very long
tradition for German banks, GBR reserves, which are the main focus of this paper,
were not introduced into German law until 1993.
340f reserves certainly contribute to the perceived opaqueness of banks, as they un-
dermine the pre- and post-decision information functions of accounting regulations.3
To some extent, this also holds for GBR reserves. They are visible, but to external
observers it is not obvious whether they represent existing risks or whether they
were just built as part of the bank’s earnings management or as a signaling device.
Furthermore, they may also have been built to enhance capital endowment and for
internal ﬁnancing purposes. However, these aims can also partly be achieved by
other means, for instance (hidden) 340f reserves, retaining earnings, or by raising
new equity.
1 Cf. Morgan (2002), Flannery et al. (2004), or Ianotta (2006), for example.
2 In this context we refer to the rules of BCBS (2006) (henceforth Basel II) which, for instance, have been
transformed into German law via the German Solvency Regulation since 2007/01/01.
3 For a closer look at the information functions of accounting cf. Beaver/Demski (1979), pp. 43-45.
1It is especially interesting to examine the use of GBR reserves, since they were not
introduced into German banking legislation voluntarily. Rather, the legislator was
forced to do so during adoption of the EC Bank Accounts Directive in 1986, since
Germany continued to allow the creation of hidden reserves according to section
340f HGB. We are therefore mainly addressing two research questions in this paper.
Firstly, we examine what factors determine the probability of a bank making use of
GBR reserves. For this analysis, the level of GBR reserves is therefore irrelevant as
long as it exceeds zero. In a second step, we identify key factors that account for the
amount of GBR reserves that have been built. To this end, we analyze the evolution
of the precise level of this balance sheet item at bank level over time, controlling for
the inﬂuence of variables such as the category a bank belongs to, its size and other
characteristics such as regulatory capital endowment and the level of risk a bank
is exposed to. Regulatory constraints as well as concepts focusing on informational
asymmetries (such as the Pecking Order Theory) help to provide explanations for
our ﬁndings and enable us to identify key factors responsible for the use of GBR
reserves.
Our empirical analysis is based on a large, unbalanced panel of 4,916 German banks
derived from the Deutsche Bundesbank’s BAKIS database. It covers the period
from 1995 through 2007, yielding a considerable number of bank-year observations
(32,023). Our ﬁndings are clearly consistent with the predictions implied by informa-
tion asymmetry outlined above. We see an increase in the use of GBR reserves over
time. Furthermore, we can say that GBR reserves are primarily used by large banks,
banks with comparatively low regulatory capital endowment, as well as those with
lower risks. Furthermore, GBR reserves are used by fairly proﬁtable banks, those
reporting according to international ﬁnancial reporting standards in addition to
HGB, and banks which are neither thrifts nor cooperative banks. Finally, we ﬁnd
that banks that make use of hidden reserves according to section 340f HGB also
tend to hold GBR reserves.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we review related
literature. Section 3 introduces the legal framework, whereas Section 4 presents
motives for (not) using GBR reserves. Moreover, the informational perspective on
the use of those reserves is evaluated and some practical issues surrounding the
decision-making process for building GBR reserves are discussed. Section 5 presents
the data set and the results of our empirical analysis. Finally, Section 6 provides
some concluding remarks.
22 Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge, no empirical analysis of GBR reserves has been con-
ducted from the perspective of the economics of information. However, risk provi-
sioning in general as well as bank loan-loss accounting in particular have been widely
discussed in the past.
Despite major diﬀerences between GBR reserves and loan-loss accruals (namely the
fact that GBR reserves are, unlike loan-loss accruals, not associated with credit risk),
literature on loan-loss provisioning is still most closely related to our analysis. At
an international level, several papers examine loan-loss provisioning empirically.
Madura/McDaniel (1989) as well as Grammatikos/Saunders (1990) analyze the ef-
fects of the announcement by Citicorp and other U.S. money-center banks that they
would increase loan-loss reserves for third world loans on the stock prices of those
banks. They ﬁnd heterogeneous evidence among the banks. Docking et al. (1997)
study diﬀerences in the contagion eﬀects of bank loan-loss reserve announcements
between money-center and regional banks in the USA for the period from 1985 to
1990. Surprisingly, they ﬁnd negative announcement eﬀects as well as contagion ef-
fects between regional banks. Ahmed et al. (1999) ﬁnd strong support for loan-loss
provisions being used for capital management only. Wall/Koch (2000) review theo-
retical and empirical evidence on bank loan-loss accounting. To do so, they take very
diﬀerent perspectives on bank regulation and capital management. Laeven/Majnoni
(2003) fathom the relationship between loan-loss provisioning and overall economic
slowdowns. Recently, Anandarajan et al. (2007) found that Australian banks use
loan-loss provisions for capital management.
Another important strand of literature mainly focuses on earnings management
and its ties to bank loan-loss provisioning. Scheiner (1981) uses data from 107 U.S.
banks for the period from 1969 through 1976 but does not detect a correlation be-
tween provision allowances and proxies for a bank’s good or bad years. By contrast,
Greenawalt/Sinkey (1988) ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence for earnings management among
U.S. banks. More recently, Bhat (1996), by analyzing a panel of U.S. banks from
1981 through 1991, ﬁnds that low-growth banks with a high loans to deposits ratio
and high leverage are more likely to carry out income smoothing. Lobo/Yang (2001)
analyze bank managers’ decisions on discretionary loan-loss provisions to smooth in-
come and to manage capital requirements. Shrieves/Dahl (2003) take a closer look
at the use of loan-loss provisions by Japanese banks during a period of ﬁnancial
duress and ﬁnd evidence for earnings and regulatory capital management. Subse-
quently, Kanagaretnam et al. (2004) ﬁnd bank managers using loan-loss provisions
as a means of communicating private information about the bank’s future prospects.
Furthermore, they ﬁnd this propensity to be greater if a bank is performing badly
3and if it is undervalued. Last but not least, Fonseca/Gonz´ alez (2008) examine loan-
loss provisions as a tool for income smoothing in a cross-country study and ﬁnd the
extent of income smoothing to be lower in countries with eﬀective supervision.
Since sections 340f and 340g HGB are speciﬁc German rules, most of the existing pa-
pers that deal with these sections merely discuss institutional and legal issues related
to the German banking market and the underlying accounting system. Shortly
after their integration into German banking legislation in 1993, Waschbusch (1994)
illustrated the main features of visible reserves. He argues that particularly inter-
nationally operating German banks will increasingly use GBR reserves to improve
their standing. Following up, Emmerich/Reus (1995) are the ﬁrst to discuss visible
and hidden reserves from a mainly informational perspective, while also showing
accounting implications for banks’ management in Germany.
Looking at the German banking market, so far only Wagener et al. (1995) have
taken an empirical perspective, but that is limited to the year 1993. They study 125
ﬁnancial statements and 35 group ﬁnancial statements. However, they do not focus
on the use of risk provisions but rather analyze all positions on the banks’ balance
sheets and proﬁt and loss accounts. With respect to GBR reserves, their focus is on
describing how many banks already held such reserves in the year they were ﬁrst
implemented (1993). They do not try to explain their ﬁndings using informational
aspects as we shall do in the following.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, we analyze the
ﬁnancial statements of a panel of 4,739 German banks, the largest sample examined
so far. The analysis covers the period from 1995 through 2007, yielding a considerable
time series of up to 13 accounting years for each bank. Most importantly, by relating
our empirical results to accounting and regulatory properties as well as informational
aspects of GBR reserves, we are able to test a number of hypotheses which shed light
on some serious agency issues.
43 Legal Framework
The item on the liability side of banks’ balance sheets called ’Reserves for General
Banking Risks’ is a direct consequence of the EC Bank Accounts Directive of 1986,
introduced into German law by section 340g HGB in 1993. According to Art. 38
of this directive, members of the EC that continued to allow their banks to build
hidden reserves (e.g. Germany through section 340f HGB) had to enable disclosure
of GBR reserves as well.4 The aim was to create a counterweight to the permission
to create hidden reserves and thus to increase pressure on banks to turn away from
a policy of minimum disclosure.5
The creation of hidden reserves has a long tradition in Germany. Though this type
of reserves is not the main focus of our paper, an awareness of the major diﬀerences
as compared to GBR reserves is important for understanding the central arguments
set out in the rest of the paper. 340f reserves are formed by deliberately undervaluing
loans and certain securities designated the so-called ‘liquidity reserve’ according to
HGB. 340f reserves are referred to as hidden because their use is not apparent from
the balance sheet or income statement. The decision to undervalue these assets is
in the hands of the bank’s management alone. However, 340f reserves are limited
to 4% of the overall value of the relevant ﬁnancial assets before the undervaluation
takes place. They have to be eliminated when ﬁling the tax statement, hence they
do not inﬂuence the bank’s tax payments.
Under the leading international ﬁnancial accounting regimes IAS/IFRS and US-
GAAP6, there is no corresponding rule, i.e. hidden reserves cannot be created in
the same way. However, IAS 30.50 - which was still eﬀective until the end of 2006 –
allowed the disclosure of reserves for general banking risks.
The funding and release of GBR reserves have to be shown in separate items of banks’
income statements. Their variation within one year is visible from the balance sheets
and the amount built during a year is shown in the income statement.7 According to
section 340g HGB, the amount of reserves must be ’reasonable’. It is not restricted to
any particular level as long as it does not yield negative net income after raising GBR
reserves. Similar to 340f reserves, the funding of GBR reserves does not inﬂuence
tax payments. In a regulatory context, they are treated as tier 1 capital according
4 For details cf. European Commission (1986).
5 Cf. for example Bauer (1987), p. 864, and Krumnow et al. (2004), pp. 604f.
6 For the sake of simplicity, we will, from now on, talk of ’IFRS accounting’ when referring to IAS/IFRS or
US-GAAP, since if a bank in our sample uses these accounting rules in addition to HGB, the vast majority
does so by means of IAS/IFRS accounting.
7 However, if a bank chooses to convert hidden reserves into visible ones, the conversion does not aﬀect the income
statement. In such a case, the level of GBR reserves increases on the balance sheet, while the corresponding
item on the income statement remains unchanged.
5to section 10 Section 2a of the German Banking Act (’KWG’), while, by contrast,
340f reserves are merely recognized as tier 2 capital. The higher quality of regulatory
capital assigned to visible reserves can be regarded as another incentive to increase
corporate disclosure.8
The decision on whether or not to fund or release GBR reserves is entirely at the
discretion of the bank’s management. Approval by shareholders is not needed to
build GBR reserves. These reserves must not be dedicated to covering the risks
arising from certain speciﬁed assets. GBR reserves display key features of equity
(economically speaking). However, from a purely legal point of view, they have to
be reported separately on a bank’s balance sheet.
8 Cf. Krumnow et al. (2004), p. 607.
64 Theoretical Background
4.1 Motives for (Not) Using GBR Reserves
Since the aim of ﬁnancial accounting is to provide information, we adopt the in-
formation content approach in this paper.9 Clearly, information given via ﬁnancial
statements can be useful in a pre- and a post-decision manner. On the one hand, dis-
closure of accounting information will help potential investors and depositors when
coming to an investment decision (pre-decision information function). On the other
hand, ﬁnancial accounting helps mitigate agency problems between bank managers
and existing investors (post-decision information function). Informational aspects
play a leading role in understanding why management may prefer to build GBR re-
serves rather than using other instruments that fulﬁll similar functions. Since bank
managers are the ones to choose, we will predominantly take their perspective as
the basis for our evaluation.
Most intuitively, GBR reserves are a means of risk provisioning and internal cap-
ital accumulation to cover general banking risks. German banks can also achieve
these aims by creating hidden 340f reserves or by retaining earnings. At least theo-
retically, raising new equity may be a third alternative to cover unforeseen risks.
As they are hidden, 340f reserves may help hide a bad signal from potential in-
vestors.10 As a result of informational asymmetries between investors and the bank’s
management, increasing visible GBR reserves may be regarded as evidence of a risen
risk level at the bank. For short, we will refer to this as the ’bad risk signal’ below. In
other words, building visible reserves may lead to a loss of conﬁdence in the bank’s
economic prosperity. Hence, potential capital suppliers may refrain from investing
in the company. However, this bad signaling eﬀect is likely to vanish over time as
more and more banks use GBR reserves.
In addition, it is important to note that the bad risk signal is of diﬀerent relevance
for diﬀerent types of institution. Firstly, money-center banks are not exposed to this
signaling eﬀect to the same extent as smaller ones. This is because the economic
well-being of large banks is assumed to have a huge impact on the stability of the
whole ﬁnancial system. Bankruptcy or illiquidity of such an institution is likely to
cause severe uncertainty regarding the safety of bank deposits. Therefore, money-
center banks are often held to be ’Too Big To Fail’ (TBTF), since governmental
9 Cf. Christensen/Demski (2003), pp. 3-6.
10 Disregarding all informational considerations for a moment, the existing limit on the amount of 340f reserves
(to 4% of the valuation basis) may present a material drawback with respect to all functions. Conﬁdential
statements from practitioners, however, suggest that this is not really a binding restriction.
7institutions are supposed to support ailing banks to avoid ﬁnancial instability.11
Secondly, banks subject to public law (for simplicity also called ’public banks’ here-
inafter), e.g. thrifts as well as federal and state banks, may also not be exposed to
this bad signal to the same extent as privately owned banks. Maintenance obliga-
tion (’Anstaltslast’) and guarantee obligation (’Gewaehrtraegerhaftung’) formerly
in place in Germany basically eliminated all likelihood of such banks becoming
bankrupt or illiquid. Maintenance and guarantee obligations, which had been an
important characteristic of the German banking market for a long time, had to be
abolished in 2005 because they did not comply with European competition regula-
tions. However, the consequences for the risk provisioning signal eﬀects are still in
place, especially because debt issued before 2005 is still protected.
Retaining earnings also serves the risk provisioning function. In terms of the decision-
making process within the bank, managers may, however, prefer to increase GBR
reserves. Shareholders’ or owners’ approval is essential for retaining earnings and also
for releasing them. Managers intending to use earnings to cover general banking risks
cannot be certain that the owners will not choose to distribute them. Consequently,
they may prefer to use their discretionary powers to build visible or hidden reserves
instead. In other words, building these reserves deprives owners of their right to
decide on the appropriation of what would otherwise become the bank’s equity. Since
investors may anticipate this behavior, increasing GBR reserves may represent a bad
signal stemming from informational asymmetries. Building reserves may indicate
that bank managers are uncertain of obtaining shareholders’ approval for retaining
earnings, since there may be more proﬁtable investment alternatives (with a similar
risk level). If so, the owners will try to extract money by claiming a higher dividend.
Due to their informational head start, the insiders’ conceivable skepticism about the
bank’s prospects can be seen as a bad signal to outside investors. In the following, we
will refer to this as a bad ’management signal’ for short. Based on insiders’ behavior,
other capital market participants may be reluctant to invest money in the company.
Nevertheless, this bad signal may also disappear over time with the increasing use of
GBR reserves. Like the bad risk signal outlined above, this bad signal is also much
less relevant for banks subject to public law. Their speciﬁc ownership structure,
with municipal and state authorities as owners, makes them virtually independent
of equity markets. There is no need to attract new shareholders and mechanisms of
stock market valuation do not apply to this type of bank. Their owners, too, may
prefer to have more rather than less proﬁts available for redistribution.
11 For more details on ﬁrst evidence for TBTF policy used by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in
the 1980s, cf. FDIC (1997), pp. 235-257. The more recent failure of Lehman Brothers may have been intended
to demonstrate that TBTF does not hold. The disruptions following the default, however, were such that
governments all over the world oﬃcially acknowledged TBTF by assuring they would rescue any bank relevant
to the ﬁnancial system.
8The theory of corporate control comes into play here. It is well proven that com-
panies with only a few (possibly large and inﬂuential) owners are monitored more
closely than companies featuring a disperse ownership structure.12 Monitoring helps
to reduce informational asymmetries between a bank’s management and its share-
holders. In Germany, banks subject to public law (mainly thrifts and federal state
banks) are usually owned by a small number of cities or municipalities, whereas
ownership of private and especially incorporated banks is usually widespread. Man-
agers of closely monitored banks may prefer to make use of hidden 340f reserves
rather than the visible alternative to avoid the bad management signal and pre-
vent shareholders from demanding the distribution of proﬁts. Combining this line
of argument with the ones for the risk and the management signal yields conﬂicting
predictions in terms of the choice between visible and hidden reserves for banks
subject to public law. On the one hand, they may not be exposed to the bad risk
and the bad management signal and therefore make use of GBR reserves. On the
other hand, their managers may be closely monitored, resulting in the primary use
of hidden 340f reserves. The question as to which of these two eﬀects outweighs the
other will be the subject of our empirical analysis in Section 5.
In terms of raising new equity as a means of risk provisioning, the main conclusions
of the Pecking Order Theory developed by Myers (1984) and Myers/Majluf (1984)
have to be taken into account. In short, companies prefer internal ﬁnance to debt
and equity issuance. Once more, the basis for this theory are informational asymme-
tries between the management of and potential investors in a company. If managers
believe a company to be undervalued, they will not raise new equity for ﬁnancing
purposes because investors will need to pay less than the company is worth. Con-
versely, managers who believe that their company is overvalued will likely issue stock
since investors will pay more than the company’s value. Thus, the attempt to sell
stock typically shows that a company is overvalued. Therefore issuing equity sends a
worse signal about the managers’ beliefs to capital markets than raising funds inter-
nally. This may result in managers’ preference for increasing GBR or 340f reserves
or retaining earnings rather than issuing equity.
Besides risk provisioning, increasing GBR reserves can also be used as a way of
internal ﬁnancing and cash ﬂow management. The level of earnings available
for distribution to owners (dividends, say) is lowered by building reserves. Thus,
free cash ﬂow does not leave the bank but is instead at management’s disposal for
ﬁnancing new projects.13 Creating 340f reserves may again be a wise alternative to
using GBR reserves from the management’s point of view, since doing so will not
12 Cf. Levine (2004), who comments on special features of corporate governance in banks.
13 Cf. Christensen/Demski (2003), pp. 125-126 for the information content of cash ﬂows and pp. 35-45 for their
impact on a ﬁrm’s value.
9send a bad risk or management signal to capital markets. This line of argument
also holds for retaining earnings, which likewise avoids conﬂicts in closely monitored
banks. However, in this case, management cannot decide about the development of
retained earnings and therefore has to convince shareholders to supply funds.
A bank’s management may also decide to deliberately use GBR reserves as a sig-
naling device to reduce any informational asymmetries between themselves and
the bank’s owners or depositors. Building these reserves shows that the bank is in a
economically strong position and that it is generating suﬃcient proﬁts to build GBR
reserves. We will from now on refer to this as the ’signal of strength’ for short. This
interpretation of course runs counter to the eﬀect, outlined above, whereby GBR
reserves act as a bad risk signal. Which of the two eﬀects outweighs the other is the
subject of our empirical analysis. The signal of strength may even be intensiﬁed by
achieving a constant rise in GBR reserves as shown on the balance sheet over time.
Conﬁdential statements from practitioners indeed prove this to be an important
motive for which the proﬁtability of a bank is certainly a key factor.
In terms of use as a signaling device, retaining earnings is the only valuable alterna-
tive to building GBR reserves. It shows that the bank is generating suﬃcient proﬁts
and is in good shape. Boosting the equity ratio by retaining earnings avoids the bad
risk signal incurred by funding GBR reserves.
Creating hidden 340f reserves is not an alternative in this context, since their level
is not visible to external observers and capital markets. Banks are, of course, free
to disclose the volume of hidden reserves they hold within the notes to the ﬁnancial
statement. However, hardly any bank does so. Issuing new equity – if deemed to have
any signaling eﬀect at all in this context – is fairly counterproductive. According to
Pecking Order Theory, issuing new equity is a clear sign that management believes
the company to be overvalued. Such an overvaluation may stem from capital markets
overestimating the bank’s future earnings potential. Therefore, the wish to raise new
equity will certainly reveal this error of judgment.
Any kind of reserves may be used as a tool for earnings management. Bank man-
agers often aim at assuring their stockholders a stable or – preferably – a slightly
growing annual dividend. An increase in the regular annual dividend is usually
interpreted by investors as a sign of management’s conﬁdence in future earnings
prospects. Therefore, stock prices and the company’s value are likely to rise follow-
ing an increase in dividends.14 Obviously, this motive is closely connected to the
aforementioned use of GBR reserves as a signaling device.
14 For further details, cf. the basic dividend model developed by Lintner (1956) and further research by
Healy/Palepu (1988) as well as Benartzi et al. (1997).
10In terms of earnings management, the only reasonable alternative to creating GBR
reserves is to use hidden 340f reserves. In years of economic well-being, proﬁts will
suﬃce to distribute stable or slightly growing dividends. At the same time, bank
management may deliberately undervalue assets within the given limits (accord-
ing to section 340f HGB). These undervaluations can be reversed in economically
bad periods to achieve dividend stability. Again, the bad management signal may
be avoided by using 340f rather than GBR reserves. Using retained earnings inﬂu-
ences declared proﬁts rather than net income and is thus inappropriate for earnings
management purposes. Raising new equity does not have any impact at all in this
context.
Having introduced some aspects that are mainly driven by informational asymme-
tries, some practical issues potentially driving the use of GBR reserves must not
be disregarded. Most closely connected to the aforementioned risk provisioning is a
bank’s need to enhance its regulatory capital endowment. Under Basel II and
the German Solvency Regulation, banks have to hold a certain amount of capital
in relation to their risk-weighted assets. GBR reserves are acknowledged as tier 1
capital and can therefore help eliminate regulatory capital shortages.
With respect to boosting the tier 1 capital endowment, retaining earnings and raising
new equity are equivalent options to an increase in GBR reserves. A bank may also
inﬂuence its regulatory capital endowment by reducing its risk-weighted assets, of
course. However, we ignore this because it is related to changes on the asset side
of the balance sheet, which we are not looking at. With respect to tier 1 capital
endowment, 340f reserves are not equivalent because they are recognized as tier 2
capital only.
Achieving an increase in a bank’s tier 1 capital endowment by retaining earnings
avoids both bad signals described above stemming from a rise in GBR reserves.
Another alternative is to raise new equity. However, the line of argument concerning
the Pecking Order Theory (as mentioned before) holds here, too.
Moreover, the obligation to disclose hidden 340f reserves when preparing ﬁnancial
statements according to IFRS in addition to HGB (we will henceforth simply call
such banks ’IFRS banks’) may be another motive for using GBR reserves. Whereas
building hidden reserves is explicitly allowed under HGB accounting, IFRS prohibit
this. Consequently, if a German bank wishes or has to prepare its (group) ﬁnancial
statements according to IFRS, it must disclose its former 340f reserves. Doing so
in its HGB unconsolidated ﬁnancial statements as well may then be beneﬁcial for
two reasons. Hidden reserves are revealed within the IFRS accounts, so they partly
lose their latent characteristics anyway. However, it is unclear whether the extent
of hidden reserves becomes fully evident when transferring HGB accounts to IFRS
11due to the diﬀerent categories of ﬁnancial instruments and the diﬀerent valuation
rules. Nevertheless, we deem this aspect to be important. Furthermore, getting rid
of hidden reserves is one step towards eliminating costly parallel book keeping.
The bank may also decide to disclose hidden reserves by putting these funds into
retained earnings rather than increasing GBR reserves. Showing these disclosed re-
serves as proﬁts and distributing them to the owners of the bank is another option
for management. Since this distribution serves neither ﬁnancing nor risk provisioning
purposes, it will not be discussed in any further detail.
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Table 1: Evaluation of GBR reserves and the alternatives.
4.2 Hypotheses
Starting from theoretical considerations, we arrive at the following hypotheses. To
simplify and enhance understandability, we will phrase the hypotheses in an eco-
nomically rather than a statistically correct manner.
H 1: The size of a bank has a positive impact on the management’s decision to use
GBR reserves.
This hypothesis refers to the fact that the bad risk signal from using GBR reserves
may not be as important for money-center banks as for smaller institutions. When
a large bank experiences ﬁnancial distress, intervention by government authorities
is very likely according to the TBTF theory.
12H 2: Being a bank subject to public law has an impact on the use of GBR reserves.
The particular ownership structure of public banks makes them less vulnerable to
either of the two bad signals caused by GBR reserves. However, the fact that banks
subject to public law are usually owned by a small number of cities or municipalities
means these banks are subject to a higher level of monitoring. Consequently, their
management may decide to use hidden 340f rather than GBR reserves as outlined
above. Which of those two eﬀects outweighs the other is the subject of our empirical
analysis.
H 3: The use of GBR reserves increases over time.
The more banks use visible reserves, the more the bad risk signal as well as the
bad management signal will diminish. So we expect to see a continuous rise in the
number of banks using GBR reserves as well as in the aggregate size of GBR reserves
for all banks from 1995 through 2007.
H 4: The risk level of a bank has an impact on the decision to use GBR reserves.
Since GBR reserves are meant to prevent general banking risks, a bank’s risk level
will presumably have an impact on their use. Hence, we expect to see a positive
correlation. By contrast, high-risk banks may be in such ﬁnancial distress that they
cannot fund reserves. Accordingly, we cannot hypothesize in advance whether a high
risk level has a positive or a negative impact on the management’s decision to fund
GBR reserves.
H 5: The regulatory capital endowment has a negative impact on the use of GBR
reserves.
Under the German Banking Act, GBR reserves are recognized as tier 1 capital.
Therefore, banks that are short of regulatory capital may prefer to build GBR rather
than 340f reserves.
H 6: Being a bank that publishes its statements according to IFRS as well as HGB
(’IFRS banks’) has a positive impact on the use of GBR reserves.
IFRS accounting does not allow for hidden reserves to be built as under section 340f
HGB. Therefore, we would expect IFRS banks to convert hidden reserves into the
visible alternative upfront, and we anticipate a strong correlation between the use
of GBR reserves and preparing ﬁnancial statements according to IFRS.
H 7: The proﬁtability of a bank has a positive impact on the decision to use GBR
reserves.
This hypothesis is closely connected to the use of GBR reserves as a signal of
strength. To be able to fund GBR reserves, a bank has to be fairly proﬁtable. There-
13fore, we should see a bank’s proﬁtability having a positive inﬂuence on its likelihood
of using GBR reserves and the extent to which it does so. One is tempted to interpret
this hypothesis in a way that assumes that GBR reserves will be used for earnings
management purposes. Since the corresponding coeﬃcient in our regressions would
have the same sign if this were the case, it is not clear which of the two eﬀects is
responsible. However, the analysis of earnings management behavior is the subject
of further research.
145 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Data and Variables
For our empirical analysis, we use data from the Bundesbank’s prudential database
BAKIS (BAKred Information System) for the years 1995 through 2007. BAKIS
is the information system on bank-speciﬁc data which is jointly operated by the
Deutsche Bundesbank and the German Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin).
The database contains information on the ﬁnancial statements and supervisory re-
ports of individual German banks. Therefore, our analysis is based on a micro panel
of annual supervisory bank-level data for 4,916 German banks.15 We merely analyze
unconsolidated accounts prepared according to HGB, since building GBR reserves
is not allowed within ﬁnancial statements prepared according to any international
accounting regime.
In some parts of our analyses, we divide the German banking market into four dif-
ferent categories according to bank size and legal status: Savings banks (henceforth:
Thrifts), cooperative banks (Coops), small private banks (henceforth: Small Cred-
its), and large banks (Large Banks). The latter category contains the ﬁve largest
German private banks as well as the federal state banks and the central institutions
of the cooperative banking sector. We are aware of the fact that this categorization is
somewhat unusual since German banks are commonly grouped merely according to
their legal status into savings banks, cooperative banks and private banks. However,
we assume that much of banking institutions’ behavior is mainly driven by their size
rather than their legal status.
We deliberately excluded other types of ﬁnancial institutions like home loan banks,
mortgage banks or securities trading banks since they either do not fulﬁll the deﬁ-
nition of a bank according to section 1 KWG or they do not conduct core banking
businesses such as lending and borrowing. Owing to a lack of data and mergers
during the observed time period, the panel is unbalanced and consists of 32,023
bank-year observations.
It is noteworthy that coverage (meaning the proportion of banks included in our
panel in relation to the overall number of banks in Germany) is always close to
and mostly exceeds 90% for each bank category in each year. For Thrifts and Small
Credits, we do achieve coverage of 100% at least for 2005, as shown in Table 2.
15 Due to our treatment of mergers, this ﬁgure is higher than the actual number of existing banks. In case of a
merger, we, technically speaking, created a new bank that is independent of the merging ones. This new bank
starts operating in the year of the merger. For the purposes of our analysis, there is no need to distinguish
between mergers, takeovers or any other kind of acquisition.
15Year Thrifts Coops Small Credits Large Banks
1995 98.9 97.2 94.9 90.9
2000 99.5 98.2 89.0 86.4
2005 100.0 98.4 89.9 89.5
Table 2: Coverage by bank groups for selected years (in %).
Thrifts Coops Small Credits Large Banks Total
Year No. row% No. row% No. row% No. row% No. row%
1995 619 18.5 2,519 75.3 188 5.6 20 0.6 3,346 100.0
1996 606 18.6 2,448 75.3 178 5.5 21 0.7 3,253 100.0
1997 594 18.7 2,364 74.6 191 6.0 20 0.6 3,169 100.0
1998 589 19.7 2,197 73.5 183 6.1 20 0.7 2,989 100.0
1999 575 20.8 1,992 72.1 177 6.4 20 0.7 2,764 100.0
2000 559 22.2 1,760 69.9 178 7.1 20 0.8 2,517 100.0
2001 535 23.0 1,597 68.8 171 7.4 19 0.8 2,322 100.0
2002 517 23.9 1,462 67.5 167 7.7 20 0.9 2,166 100.0
2003 488 23.9 1,375 67.4 159 7.8 19 0.9 2,041 100.0
2004 476 24.2 1,317 67.0 154 7.8 18 0.9 1,965 100.0
2005 463 24.4 1,273 67.2 142 7.5 17 0.9 1,895 100.0
2006 454 24.7 1,234 67.0 135 7.3 18 1.0 1,841 100.0
2007 427 24.3 1,189 67.8 122 7.0 17 1.0 1,755 100.0
Total 6,902 21.6 22,727 71.0 2,145 6.7 249 0.8 32,023 100.0
Table 3: Number of observations in the panel by bank categories over time.
Table 3 gives detailed information on the number of banks observed in our panel and
the split between the bank categories over time. The share of each bank category is
fairly constant over time, whereas the absolute number of banks decreases (almost)
steadily, reﬂecting mergers that have occurred in the German banking sector in the
last decade. Coops dominate our sample. They have a share of roughly 71%, followed
by Thrifts (22%), Small Credits (7%), and Large Banks with about 1%.
We apply the following variables to measure the use of GBR reserves: GBRi,t is
the amount of GBR reserves of bank i in year t and GBRTA
i,t is the share of GBR
reserves in relation to total assets of bank i in year t. The binary variable D GBRi,t
takes the value 1 if bank i shows a positive amount of GBR reserves in year t (thus
GBRi,t > 0) and 0 otherwise.
Regarding H1,w eu s eSIZEi,t as a proxy for the size of the bank, which is measured
as the natural logarithm of total assets of bank i in year t. To prevent endogeneity,
we exclude the amount of GBR reserves included in a bank’s total assets.
With respect to H2, D PUBLICi is 1 if bank i is subject to public law and 0
otherwise. This variable is constant over time because changes in legal status did
not occur.
16Referring to H3, we are including time dummy variables τt. Hence, we can control
for changes in GBR reserves during the course of our analysis and ﬁnd time-ﬁxed
eﬀects.
To account for banks’ individual risk levels (corresponding to H4), we use the non-
performing loan ratio of a bank i in year t and name it NPLi,t. The choice of this
proxy is based on the assumption that banks with a high NPL ratio are also exposed
to generally high risk levels. It is calculated as the ratio of non-performing to total
customer loans. Loans are non-performing if the bank is waiting for payments which
are overdue by at least 90 days.16
To somehow control for banks using GBR reserves as a signal of strength, we ﬁnally
include D 340fi,t, a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a bank is using any
hidden 340f reserves and 0 otherwise. If a bank is able to fund both types of
reserves, it is likely in a strong economic position, and one way of showing this is by
means of GBR reserves.
To analyze the endowment with regulatory capital (relevant to H5), we use the level
of tier 1 capital a bank has in relation to its risk-weighted assets. Once more to
prevent endogeneity when examining the inﬂuence of the tier 1 capital endowment,
we exclude the volume of GBR reserves inherent in tier 1 capital. The corresponding
variable is named TIER1i,t.
The dummy D IFRSi,t is used for H6, t. It takes the value 1 if bank i in year
t prepares its (group) ﬁnancial statements according to IFRS in addition to HGB
and 0 otherwise. Note that this dummy is time-variant because many banks changed
their status from ’non-IFRS’ to ’IFRS’ (but not the other way round) during the
period of our analysis.
Finally, we use ROAi,t, which is the return on assets (ROA) of bank i in year t,
as a proxy for the proﬁtability of a bank. With respect to H7, it is calculated as
the ratio of operating income (income before risk provisioning) to total assets of
bank i in year t. Using operating income rather than net income or declared proﬁts
eliminates any eﬀects stemming from legal accounting policy on the one hand or
manipulation on the other hand.
A relatively moderate outlier treatment is applied to the dataset, in which we trun-
cate explanatory variables (except for dummy variables) at the 0.5% and 99.5%
quantile. To account for the heterogeneity of the capital adequacy ratio (tier 1
16 For technical reasons, the numerator of this ratio, on top of troubled customer loans also comprises non-
performing interbank lending, whereas the denominator merely contains the sum of a bank’s customer loans.
Thus, the NPL ratios may be overstated to a certain extent. However, since the volume of troubled interbank
loans has generally been low, at least before the start of the ﬁnancial crisis, this should be negligible.
17No. of TA in D PUBLIC D IFRS D 340f TIER1 NPL ROA
Category banks EUR 1,000 (in %) (in %) (in %) (in %) (in %) (in %)
Thrifts 762 1,745,338 98.7 0.1 98.6 7.8 3.9 0.7
Coops 3,633 303,811 0.0 0.0 95.2 8.5 5.2 0.7
Small Credits 311 2,863,477 0.0 5.3 42.4 11.2 6.5 0.7
Large Banks 33 70,512,546 60.6 28.5 91.2 7.5 2.6 0.22
Total 4,916 1,331,881 21.7 0.6 92.4 8.5 5.0 0.7
Table 4: Number of banks and mean of observations in the panel by category.
capital of a bank in relation to its risk-weighted assets), we use an upper-bound
truncation of this variable at the 97% quantile.
Table 4 shows the number of banks per category as well as averages per category and
across all banks for these variables. Since the table shows the mean of observations
and not the mean of banks, those banks with many observations in the panel have
a higher weight than banks which contribute only a few observations. The quite low
average of total assets for all banks is the result of the dominance of Coops in the
sample. Generally speaking, correlation is low and multicollinearity is therefore not
a serious problem. Table 5 reports the correlation coeﬃcients for the variables in
our analysis.
Variables D GBR GBR




SIZE 0.1893 0.0652 1.0000
D PUBLIC 0.0316 -0.0097 0.5303 1.0000
D IFRS 0.1319 0.0360 0.2212 -0.0208 1.0000
D 340f 0.0403 0.0371 0.0001 0.1234 -0.0839 1.0000
TIER1 0.0228 0.0578 -0.1993 -0.1502 0.0129 -0.1499 1.0000
NPL -0.0996 -0.0553 -0.1120 -0.1353 -0.0513 -0.3002 0.0199 1.0000
ROA 0.0021 0.0292 -0.0802 -0.0289 -0.0386 0.1903 0.1193 -0.2610
Table 5: Pairwise correlations.
185.2 Results
5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
First of all, we compute the share of banks holding a positive volume of GBR reserves
with the help of the mean of D GBR17.F o rThrifts, Figure 1 shows that this share
slowly increased until 2000, followed by a steeper rise in recent years (reaching 34%
in 2007). For Coops, a similar, even more pronounced development is characterized
by a rapid increase in 2003, 2006 and 2007. The share of Coops using GBR reserves
has doubled from 2005 to 2007, ultimately reaching 43%. The share of Small Credits
showing GBR reserves increased slightly in the years from 1995 through 2001 and
ﬂuctuated between 10% and 17% until 2007.
The Large Banks take the lead in the use of GBR reserves, starting at a share of
about 30% in 1995, and ﬂuctuating between 70% and 83% until 2007. When looking
at these numbers, it has to be considered that the overall number of banks within
this category is fairly small. Since federal or state banks (being large and public) as
well as large cooperative central and the largest German private banks are included
in this category, our ﬁndings are in line with hypothesis H1 (size). This is true for
the initially hesitant use of GBR reserves within Thrifts and Coops and the low
share of usage within Small Credits as well, since these groups primarily consist of
smaller banks. Further conﬁrmation is provided by the correlation coeﬃcients for
D GBR and SIZE in Table 5.
With respect to H2 (public), our ﬁndings indicate that the extent of monitoring and
corporate control lowers the use of GBR reserves, since almost all banks subject to
public law are Thrifts and largely did not make use of GBR reserves, at least in the
early years of our analysis. The conﬂicting (since positive) sign of the correlation
coeﬃcient of D PUBLIC with D GBR (as given in Table 5) calls for a deeper
analysis regarding the dummy for banks subject to public law, as we outline in the
next section.
The share of banks using GBR reserves within the banking sector as a whole rose
steadily from 0.8% in 1995 to 39.2% in 2007. Bearing in mind that Thrifts and
Coops dominate our sample, Figure 1 clearly exhibits this rise. This conﬁrms our
hypothesis regarding time, H3.
To gain deeper insight into the use of GBR reserves, we counted the number of activ-
ities involving these reserves over time (cf. Table 6). The second column First year


















































































































Figure 1: Share of banks using GBR reserves per bank category over time.
is a fairly technical one listing observations for which we cannot clearly identify the
activity as data for the previous period is lacking. Furthermore, we distinguished be-
tween ﬁrst-time implementation (Implement), an increase (Raise), a constant level
of zero (Hold at zero), a constant level above zero (Hold above zero), a decrease to
a still positive level (Reduce), and a termination of the whole balance sheet item
(Terminate). Apparently, an existing level is increased much more often than low-
ered. Similarly, we observed substantially more implementations than terminations.
Supporting H3 (time), the number of implementations clearly increases over time,
including a sudden rise in 2003.
In this paragraph, we will exclusively focus on those observations where banks use
GBR reserves and on the question of what level of reserves those banks hold.18
To eliminate size eﬀects, we use the ratio of GBR reserves to total assets GBRTA.
Figure 2 shows how this ratio has evolved over time, broken down by bank category.
It reveals startling results especially for Small Credits. The ratio of GBR reserves
to total assets is remarkably high in 1995 and falls to a lower level afterwards.
Once more, a steep rise is visible during 2001 and 2002 followed by a sharp decline
to a fairly constant level of roughly 0.5% of total assets. When interpreting these
ﬁndings, the small number of banks showing these reserves within this group has to
18 Technically speaking, we are neglecting all observations with D GBRi,t = 0,i . e .w et a k eab a n ki n t oa c c o u n t
only in those years in which its level of GBR reserves is positive.
20Year First Imple- Raise Hold Hold Reduce Terminate Total
year ment (= 0) (> 0)
1995 3,346 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,346
1996 153 12 13 3,062 12 0 1 3,253
1997 125 6 8 2,974 25 1 30 3,169
1998 179 20 12 2,727 23 1 27 2,989
1999 205 14 17 2,473 26 0 29 2,764
2000 228 24 28 2,193 24 2 18 2,517
2001 185 31 28 2,013 43 1 21 2,322
2002 140 27 51 1,887 43 4 14 2,166
2003 134 120 64 1,659 46 3 15 2,041
2004 75 70 117 1,571 119 3 10 1,965
2005 65 76 170 1,447 120 4 13 1,895
2006 45 176 234 1,239 134 7 6 1,841
2007 36 154 345 1,028 171 5 16 1,755
Total 4,916 730 1,087 24,273 786 31 200 32,023
Table 6: Number of activities involving GBR reserves over time.
be considered. Thus, the results are driven by very few institutions. For Thrifts,a
steady increase is visible for the years from 1997 onwards. This is generally true for






































































































Figure 2: GBRTA by bank category over time.
215.2.2 Regression Models
Addressing the ﬁrst of our research questions, relating to the factors driving the
probability of a bank making use of GBR reserves, it is helpful to estimate probit
models using D GBR as the dependent variable. This is done in Model A.1,w h e r e
we examine the inﬂuence of the independent variables SIZE (referring to hypothesis
H1), D PUBLIC (H2), NPL (H4), D 340f (indirectly related to H7), TIER1 (H5),
D IFRS (H6)a n dROA (H7) on the probability that a bank will use GBR reserves.
Moreover, we include the time dummies (τt) to ﬁnd time-ﬁxed eﬀects (referring to
H3). Since we do not control for any unobservable random or bank-ﬁxed eﬀects, it
is simply a pooled time-ﬁxed eﬀects estimation. The formal design of Model A.1 is
given in equation (1):
P(D GBRi,t =1 ) =β0 + β1 · SIZEi,t + β2 · D PUBLICi + β3 · NPLi,t
+ β4 · TIER1i,t + β5 · D 340fi,t + β6 · D IFRSi,t




The estimated coeﬃcients as well as the corresponding standard errors (in brackets)
are shown in the second column of Table 7. Additionally, the AUR value as well as
the number of observations with D GBR = 0 are given at the bottom.19
With respect to the second research question, we investigate which factors are re-
sponsible for the precise level of GBR reserves a bank’s management chooses to
hold. To this end, we employ a tobit model (Model A.2) with GBRTA as the de-
pendent variable. The tobit methodology20 accounts for the fact that the level of
GBR reserves is naturally truncated at zero. Ignoring this and using OLS regression
models, which allow for negative values of the dependent variable, would systemat-
ically underestimate the slope of the regression line. We are using the same set of
independent variables as in Model A.1 and again pooling the data while controlling
for time-ﬁxed eﬀects. The formal design of Model A.2 i sg i v e ni ne q u a t i o n( 2 ) :
19 To assess the ﬁt of the overall Model A.1, we calculate the AUR value, which equals the area under the so-called
Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve. For a more detailed description of ROC curve analysis cf. Flach et al.
(2003) and Fawcett (2006). In our case, the AUR value measures the ability of the model to correctly identify
those banks using GBR reserves (thus having D GBRi,t = 1) and those not using them. The larger the AUR
value (equaling the area under the ROC curve), the more accurate the model in question is. The corresponding
AUR value of roughly 86% means that our model has excellent accuracy.





Yi,t if Yi,t > 0
0i f Yi,t ≤ 0
Yi,t = β0 + β1 · SIZEi,t + β2 · D PUBLICi + β3 · NPLi,t
+ β4 · TIER1i,t + β5 · D 340fi,t + β6 · D IFRSi,t
+ β7 · ROAi,t +
11
t=1[β(10+t) · τ(1995+t)]+ i,t.
(2)
The estimated coeﬃcients as well as the corresponding standard errors (in brackets)
are shown in the third column of Table 7. Additionally, ¯ R2
pseudo and the number of
observations with GBRTA = 0 are given at the bottom.
In order to test whether an independent variable has an impact on D GBR (GBRTA
respectively), i.e. the corresponding β is non-zero, we should be able to reject the null
hypothesis of β = 0 at a preferably high level of signiﬁcance.21 Broadly speaking, the
results of both analyses are identical (with respect to the sign of the coeﬃcients).
Therefore, we conclude that the variables driving the probability of using GBR
reserves also inﬂuence the level of GBRTA.22
As expected, we ﬁnd a strongly signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence of the variable SIZE,
i.e. β1 > 0, which means that large banks tend to use GBR reserves more often than
small banks and show a higher level. Once more, our (economic) hypothesis H1 is
conﬁrmed.
Because β2 < 0, the dummy variable D PUBLIC apparently has a negative and
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the probability of a bank making use of GBR reserves. In
other words, if a bank is subject to public law, it is less likely to use visible reserves
than if it is privately owned. Therefore, H2 is also conﬁrmed.23 The eﬀect of a close
monitoring of the management in banks subject to public law (suggesting that those
banks’ managers will not make use of GBR reserves) obviously outweighs the lines
of argument relating to both the risk and the management signal (suggesting that
21 In the following, we say for short that the independent variable has a signiﬁcantly positive impact on the
dependent variable, meaning that the corresponding coeﬃcient has a positive sign and signiﬁcantly diﬀers from
0 according to the t-test.
22 This proves that the choice of the tobit model is appropriate in our setting. If diﬀerent variables inﬂuenced the
likelihood of the use of GBR reserves and the level of GBRTA, results would be diﬀerent in those two model
types. A Heckman approach would then be adequate for modeling our research questions correctly.
23 At ﬁrst sight, this result contradicts the positive correlation coeﬃcient between D PUBLIC and D GBR (as
given in Table 5). However, this may be owing to the considerable positive correlation between D PUBLIC
and SIZE. In other words, the fact that large banks are usually more likely to use GBR reserves and that, at
the same time, public banks are fairly large may cause this correlation which more than compensates for the
negative eﬀect of D PUBLIC on D GBR.
23Control variables SIZE & D PUBLIC Bank category
Model A.1 A.2 B.1 B.2
(Probit) (Tobit) (Probit) (Tobit)
dependent variable D GBR GBRTA D GBR GBRTA
SIZE 0.175*** 0.143***
(β1) (0.011) (0.009)
D PUBLIC -0.288*** -0.290***
(β2) (0.032) (0.031)
NPL -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.026*** -0.026***
(β3) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
TIER1 -0.043*** -0.036*** -0.063*** -0.051***
(β4) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
D 340f 0.174*** 0.190*** 0.177** 0.163***
(β5) (0.066) (0.055) (0.082) (0.062)
D IFRS 0.622*** 0.271*** 0.625*** 0.246**
(β6) (0.119) (0.094) (0.138) (0.097)
ROA 0.133*** 0.184*** 0.158*** 0.205***







1996 0.144 0.149 0.169* 0.168*
(β11) (0.095) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099)
1997 0.202** 0.213** 0.242** 0.242**
(β12) (0.094) (0.096) (0.097) (0.098)
1998 0.323*** 0.342*** 0.386*** 0.393***
(β13) (0.090) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093)
1999 0.375*** 0.399*** 0.465*** 0.469***
(β14) (0.089) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
2000 0.533*** 0.572*** 0.648*** 0.662***
(β15) (0.088) (0.090) (0.091) (0.091)
2001 0.682*** 0.742*** 0.822*** 0.851***
(β16) (0.087) (0.089) (0.090) (0.089)
2002 0.823*** 0.883*** 0.982*** 1.007***
(β17) (0.087) (0.088) (0.089) (0.088)
2003 1.213*** 1.284*** 1.384*** 1.417***
(β18) (0.082) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085)
2004 1.373*** 1.436*** 1.555*** 1.578***
(β19) (0.081) (0.084) (0.084) (0.085)
2005 1.519*** 1.585*** 1.710*** 1.735***
(β20) (0.081) (0.083) (0.083) (0.085)
2006 1.861*** 1.991*** 2.064*** 2.148***
(β21) (0.081) (0.084) (0.083) (0.085)
2007 2.103*** 2.288*** 2.319*** 2.456***
(β22) (0.081) (0.085) (0.084) (0.086)
Observations 32,023 32,023 32,023 32,023
Observations = 0 29,218 29,218 29,218 29,218
AUR value 0.859 0.855
¯ R2
pseudo 0.2362 0.2381
Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: Results of pooled regression models.
24banks subject to public law are likely to make greater use of GBR reserves than
others).
The coeﬃcient on NPL, β3, is strongly signiﬁcant and negative. This indicates that
banks with a low volume of non-performing loans in relation to their customer loans
are more likely to use GBR reserves and they are doing so to a greater extent.
Since the NPL ratio measures the risk level of a bank, the probability that low risk
banks will use GBR reserves, and with a higher intensity, is obviously higher. H4 is
backed.24
Looking at TIER1, the corresponding coeﬃcient β4 is signiﬁcantly negative, meaning
that banks which are short of regulatory capital build higher levels of GBR reserves
and do so more often. Thus, H5 is backed, too.
An interesting result is indicated by the positive coeﬃcient β5 (relating to the vari-
able D 340f ). This positive coeﬃcient shows that banks that already hold 340f
reserves are more likely to use visible GBR reserves, too, and to use them with
higher intensity.25 This supports the hypothesis that reserves serve as a signaling
device (inherent in H7) for the following reason. Banks which are able to build 340f
reserves are assumed to be economically healthy. Thus, they may use GBR reserves
(as a clearly visible balance sheet item) to signal their strength to outsiders. More-
over, it might also be the case that some banks ﬁrst build up 340f reserves to the
4% limit of the overall value of the relevant ﬁnancial assets, and later on they make
use of GBR reserves.
Since β6 > 0, the variable D IFRS has a positive and signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
probability and intensity of the use of GBR reserves. Banks that prepare accounts
according to IFRS are more likely to hold GBR reserves than other banks. Further-
more, they build higher levels of these reserves. Hence, H6 is supported as was the
case with respect to the correlation coeﬃcients in Table 5.
In line with the function of GBR reserves as a signal of strength, β7 is signiﬁcant and
positive, meaning that banks with a high ROA are more likely to use GBR reserves
and are doing so to a greater extent than banks with a lower return in relation to
their total assets. H7 is conﬁrmed by the regression outcomes as well as the positive
correlation coeﬃcients in Table 5.
Finally, all coeﬃcients on the time dummies, β11 to β22, are signiﬁcant at a high
level except for the year 1996. Moreover, the coeﬃcients are steadily increasing.
This is statistically strong evidence for hypothesis H3 predicting increasing use of
24 The corresponding correlation coeﬃcient in Table 5 conﬁrms this result.
25 This also holds when looking at the corresponding correlation coeﬃcient in Table 5.
25GBR reserves over time. Furthermore, it reinforces the results shown in the merely
descriptive part of our analysis.
In the following step, we substitute the independent variables SIZE and D PUBLIC
with control variables for each but one of the four bank categories.26 Along the
lines of Model A.1 and A.2, we ﬁrst use the probit Model B.1 addressing the ﬁrst
research question, followed by the tobit model B.2 with respect to the second one.
The key ﬁndings of these models are shown in the last two columns of Table 7. When
controlling for the bank categories, Large Banks are the basis, which is why their
coeﬃcient is not stated.
Since all coeﬃcients of the other categories are signiﬁcantly negative, it is striking
that Large Banks are most likely to use GBR reserves, followed by Small Credits,
Coops,a n dThrifts. The same order of precedence holds for the level of the reserves
in relation to total assets. These results coincide with the previous ﬁnding of size
(and being a bank subject to public law, respectively) having a positive (negative)
impact on the likelihood and intensity of a bank showing visible reserves. Thus, it
conﬁrms H1 (H2). Regarding all other independent variables, the signs and (in the
vast majority of cases) even the levels of signiﬁcance are identical to the previous
models. Thus, Models B.1 and B.2 may be considered as robustness checks for the
models in block A.
To account for the possibility that the variables examined so far do not capture all
potential determinants for using GBR reserves, which is indeed a pivotal assumption
for using pooled regression models, we conduct further robustness checks. To this
end, we successively investigate a set of variables identical to the ones used in the
last four models. We now control for unobservable eﬀects that are constant over
time and diﬀer between banks by using a random eﬀects panel methodology in the
regressions.27 The outcomes of these models (which are given similar names to their
pooled forerunners by adding an asterisk (*) (as for instance Model A.1*)), are
shown in Table 8, which exhibits an identical structure to Table 7.
The results of these models mimic those of the previous ones to a large extent.
However, β6 concerning D IFRS and β7 concerning ROA change to a negative and
signiﬁcant sign, respectively.28 Obviously, the bank-speciﬁc eﬀect causes the emerg-
26 Owing to the way we distinguish between the diﬀerent bank categories, it is necessary to do this rather than
including all variables in one single regression equation. Otherwise, the eﬀects of the size and the public character
of a bank would not be isolated correctly. By deﬁnition, the Large Banks contain the largest banks within the
sample and the category Thrifts consists (almost) entirely of public banks and contains most of these banks.
27 Due to the very low variance of D GBR on a bank-individual level, a bank-ﬁxed eﬀects estimator would not
yield reasonable results. Furthermore, it is not possible to isolate the eﬀect of time-invariant variables (e.g.
D PUBLIC) from the unobservable ﬁxed eﬀect using this regression technique.
28 Moreover, β5 lost its signiﬁcance within the tobit models, but did not change its sign.
26Control variables SIZE & D PUBLIC Bank category
Model A.1* A.2* B.1* B.2*
(Probit) (Tobit) (Probit) (Tobit)
dependent variable D GBR GBRTA D GBR GBRTA
SIZE 0.588*** 0.137***
(β1) (0.072) (0.018)
D PUBLIC -1.058*** -0.277***
(β2) (0.188) (0.066)
NPL -0.057*** -0.022*** -0.062*** -0.023***
(β3) (0.013) (0.004) (0.012) (0.004)
TIER1 -0.093*** -0.019*** -0.132*** -0.026***
(β4) (0.021) (0.007) (0.021) (0.007)
D 340f 0.316* 0.026 0.287* -0.009
(β5) (0.162) (0.056) (0.0168) (0.057)
D IFRS -0.999*** -0.699*** -0.696** -0.681***
(β6) (0.334) (0.078) (0.302) (0.076)
ROA -0.170*** -0.065*** -0.153** -0.063***







1996 0.685*** 0.148* 0.734*** 0.156**
(β11) (0.224) (0.076) (0.227) (0.075)
1997 0.887*** 0.189** 0.979*** 0.209***
(β12) (0.226) (0.076) (0.230) (0.076)
1998 1.257*** 0.308*** 1.400*** 0.340***
(β13) (0.222) (0.073) (0.227) (0.073)
1999 1.504*** 0.385*** 1.692*** 0.432***
(β14) (0.225) (0.073) (0.234) (0.072)
2000 1.847*** 0.490*** 2.035*** 0.544***
(β15) (0.233) (0.071) (0.242) (0.071)
2001 2.106*** 0.597*** 2.316*** 0.658***
(β16) (0.242) (0.071) (0.249) (0.071)
2002 2.426*** 0.708*** 2.651*** 0.775***
(β17) (0.250) (0.071) (0.253) (0.071)
2003 3.700*** 1.179*** 3.896*** 1.248***
(β18) (0.282) (0.068) (0.269) (0.069)
2004 4.231*** 1.361*** 4.430*** 1.435***
(β19) (0.300) (0.069) (0.278) (0.069)
2005 4.696*** 1.527*** 4.902*** 1.604***
(β20) (0.318) (0.069) (0.287) (0.069)
2006 5.747*** 1.961*** 5.938*** 2.043***
(β21) (0.364) (0.070) (0.311) (0.070)
2007 6.595*** 2.317*** 6.785*** 2.405***
(β22) (0.403) (0.072) (0.332) (0.072)
Observations (Total) 32,023 32,023 32,023 32,023
Observations = 0 29,218 29,218
AUR value 0.860 0.853
Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Coeﬃcients of random eﬀects models.
27ing changes.29 The positive signs concerning ROA produced by the pooled models
show that banks with high ROA tend to be the ones that build high levels of GBR
reserves and vice versa. However, the opposite signs produced by the panel regres-
sions indicate that within banks an increase in ROA over time is accompanied by
a decrease in GBR reserves. Further investigation of this issue delivered the insight
that the variance of ROA is much larger between than within banks. This ﬁnding
may explain why it is reasonable to observe the coeﬃcient of ROA turning from
positive to negative.
A similar line of argument holds for D IFRS. Among banks, we observe that IFRS
banks tend to build a higher level of GBR reserves. However, the panel regression
indicates that within those banks GBR reserves are primarily used in years pre-
IFRS. Moreover, since the vast majority of German banks still exclusively adheres
to HGB accounting and since institutions that adopted IFRS at one point in time
did not reverse this decision later on, there are only very few changes to the variable
D IFRS.I no t h e rw o r d s ,D IFRS can be considered to be (nearly) constant over
time. This characteristic may make the variable somewhat vulnerable in the context
of a random eﬀects panel regression.
29 Based on economic considerations, we feel comfortable making the crucial (but untestable) assumption that
the unobservable eﬀect is orthogonal to all regressors. Note that it is not possible to test for the absence of
correlation with the unobservable eﬀect and thus to control for the appropriateness of applying a random eﬀects
methodology.
286 Conclusion
Banks with a proﬁtable business have several instruments at their disposal to set
aside money to cover their general risks and also to keep money in the bank for
funding further investments. Apart from earnings retention or raising new equity,
German banks may deliberately undervalue certain assets to create hidden reserves
according to section 340f HGB or declare visible reserves, i.e. reserves for general
banking risks according to section 340g HGB. From an information and agency
perspective, management should take into account the following aspects in making
a decision:
• Hidden reserves are the method of choice because managers gain some discretion
in earnings management. However, such reserves are not allowed under IFRS
accounting. Moreover, unlike the three other options, 340f reserves merely con-
stitute tier 2, not tier 1 regulatory capital. Therefore, weakly capitalized banks
should be more likely to use GBR reserves than IFRS banks.
• Nevertheless, GBR reserves may also be used as a signal of strength. In that
sense, fairly well capitalized and proﬁtable banks should be more likely to use
GBR reserves instead of or in addition to hidden reserves.
• Using GBR reserves may be interpreted as a bad signal stemming from in-
creased visible risk provisioning. In addition, the use of these reserves may be
a consequence of the management’s fear that owners will not supply capital for
future investments: without management’s decision to increase GBR reserves,
it would be at the owners’ discretion whether to leave earnings in the bank
for future investments or to distribute them, as dividends say. The negative
signal is less relevant for banks which have some other way of demonstrating
their good standing, particularly a very small probability of default. Therefore,
banks subject to public law should be more likely to make use of GBR reserves
due to their public guarantees. The same holds for large institutions if the ’Too
Big To Fail’ presumption holds true. Furthermore, both negative signals be-
come less relevant the more frequently they are sent by banks. Therefore we
would expect the number of institutions using GBR reserves to rise over time.
• The theory of corporate governance and control predicts that banks with a
small number of shareholders are monitored more closely than those with a large
number of shareholders. Since banks subject to public law are generally owned
by just a few cities or municipalities, they are likely to be closely controlled.
This may induce their managers to use hidden reserves instead of visible ones
and thus oﬀset the eﬀect described above.
29Our empirical analysis of the German banking market, including 32,023 bank-year
observations for the period 1995 through 2007, applies probit and tobit models in
terms of pooled as well as random eﬀects panel estimation techniques. We arrived
at the following statistically signiﬁcant results:
• Larger banks are more likely to use GBR reserves and tend to hold higher
levels than smaller ones. The same is true of banks with low regulatory capital
endowment and banks already using hidden 340f reserves.
• Banks that are subject to public law make use of GBR reserves less often and
also to a smaller extent. The same holds for high-risk banks, meaning those
with relatively high non-performing loan ratios.
• The pooled regression analysis indicates that banks with higher levels of return
on assets tend to build GBR reserves more often and to a greater extent. How-
ever, our random eﬀects models show that an increase in proﬁtability within
banks over time is accompanied by a decrease in the probability and extent of
building GBR reserves.
• Among banks we observe that IFRS banks are more likely to use GBR reserves
and tend to hold higher levels. However, the panel regressions indicate that
within those banks GBR reserves are primarily used in years pre-IFRS.
• Even when controlling for all other factors, the general use of GBR reserves as
well as their ratio to total assets increases, almost strictly monotonically, over
time.
Agency issues are still sometimes seen as a fairly theoretical concept. However, the
present study is another contribution demonstrating that they may yield highly
relevant predictions. Their robustness deserves further attention. Moreover, looking
at reserves building in banks as a joint decision-making process with respect to
visible GBR and hidden 340f reserves may yield interesting results. Further research
is therefore needed to explicitly take this into account too.
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